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YOUNG V. STENSRUDE: FISHING
THROUGH BASS FOR THE
BOUNDARIES OF NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Bass v. Nooney Co.I expanded
liability by recognizing negligent infliction of emotional distress 2 as a new
and independent tort.' In so doing, it resolved the controversy that arose
from the historical notion that emotional tranquility in itself received little
protection against negligent invasions.4 The resolution, however, has given
rise to a new controversy: is this new tort capable of being applied reason-
ably?' Do the standards enuicated in Bass provide a sufficient boundary
within which deserving plaintiffs can recover while shielding defendants from
potentially excessive or unlimited liability?
This casenote will review the traditional limitations on recovery for emo-
tional distress. It will then examine the boundaries of liability that exist under
present law as set forth in Bass and, more recently, Young v. Stensrude6
1. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
2. "Emotional distress" has no precise legal or medical definition. Different
courts use different terms to denote the same idea such as emotional harm, emotional
distress, emotional disturance, mental harm, mental distress, and mental disturbance.
For instance, the Bass court used the term "emotional distress" when stating the new
rule while the court in Young v. Stensrude, 664 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984),
used the term "emotional harm." In this casenote the terms are used interchangeably.
See Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical Impact or Sub-
sequent Physical Injury, 47 Mo. L. REV. 124, 124 n.5 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
3. 646 S.W.2d at 772.
4. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed.
1984).
5. 646 S.W.2d at 779, 781 (Welliver, J., & Donnelly, J., dissenting); see also
Note, Duty, Foreseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME.
L. REV. 303, 303 (1981) ("The recognition of the negligent infliction of mental distress
as a seperate basis of liability has produced disagreement over when a plaintiff may
recover.").
6. 664 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). This casenote will not discuss the
bystander recovery rule. Bass explicitly did not extend to bystanders, 646 S.W.2d at
770 n.3, and Young was not a bystander case.
1
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED MENTAL DISTRESS:
A SUMMARY OF OTHER RECOVERY BOUNDARIES
Traditionally, the common law did not recognize negligent infliction of
emotional distress as an independent tort.7 Thus, if no independently pro-
tected right had been violated, a plaintiff could not recover for negligently
inflicted emotional harm no matter how foreseeable the risk of such harm.8
This nonrecognition rule was based on judicial apprehension and restraint.9
Traditional tort principles were not used to grant legal redress for emotional
injuries, the dominant policy being that the courts were ill equipped to handle
such claims because the genuineness of mental distress was incapable of
adequate and objective legal proof.'0
As society became more complex and the social utility associated with
emotional tranquility became more pronounced," arbitrary rules began to be
formulated.' 2 These arbitrary rules attempted to fill the void in the law which
7. Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery Without Loss of
Jury Control, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 942 (1983); see also Green, Foreseeability in
Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417 (1961) ("Negligence law is designed
primarily to protect people against physical hurts to persons and property uninten-
tionally inflicted by the dangerous activities of other people."); Note, The Death of
the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213, 216 (1981) ("From its beginnings, negligence
law has been concerned primarily with physical injury.").
8. Recovery for mental distress is allowed as parasitic damages if an inde-
pendently protected right has been violated. Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress as an Independent Cause of Action in California: Do Defendants Face Un-
limited Liability?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 181, 184-85 (1982); see also Jarchow v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d. 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975) (breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing resulted in recovery for emotional
distress); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970)
(negligent breach of bailor-bailee relationship gives rise to recovery for emotional in-
jury); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973) (invasion of privacy constitutes
a legal injury for which mental suffering is recoverable).
9. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Inde-
pendent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1237 (1971).
10. "[T]o hold persons who are merely negligent bound to anticipate and guard
against fright and the consequenses of fright ... would open a wide door for unjust
claims which could not successfully be met." Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass.
258, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
11. "[A] sound mind within a disabled body can accomplish much, while a
disabled mind in the soundest of bodies is rarely capable of making any sustantial
contribution to society." Comment, supra note 9, at 1237; see J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 192 (3d ed. 1964).
12. See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 485,
488, 510 (1982). "A rule may be considered ... arbitrary when measured against a
single policy, because it is supported by a number of competing and inconsistent
policies and represents a compromise among them." Id. at 481-82.
2
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had formally barred recovery for emotional distress. The rules were consid-
ered arbitrary because recovery for emotional distress was only allowed if a
plaintiff's claim fell within the boundaries of special qualifying factors.'
These qualifying factors were not designed to recognize emotional tranquility
as a complete protectable interest.' 4 Rather, they were designed as a com-
promise seeking to expand liability on the one hand, while limiting this
expansion to certain circumstances likely to minimize the risk of trivial or
feigned claims on the other.'5
A. The Impact Rule
One set of qualifying factors, previously followed in Missouri,' 6 which
permitted a plaintiff to recover for emotional harm was called the impact
rule.' 7 The impact rule allowed recovery for mental distress only when the
physical impact itself of defendant's negligence inflicted direct physical in-
jury. 8 19 With an underlying cause of action based on direct physical injury,
emotional distress damages were deemed "parasitic" and compensation for
such damages was allowed. 20 Sufficient assurances that the emotional injuries
13. "Special qualifying factors" means the specific requirements under the
various rules which allow recovery for emotional distress recovery.
14. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 925, 616 P.2d 813, 817,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1980).
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 4.
16. Although Missouri cases have not referred to the impact rule by name, a
general statement of the prior Missouri rule can be found in Crutcher v. Cleveland,
C., C. & St. L. R.R., 132 Mo. App. 311, 111 S.W. 891 (1908):
We remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no recovery for fright,
terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by
some physical injury; and, if this rule is to stand we think it should be held
that there can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused
solely by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person
from without.
Id. at 318, 111 S.W. at 893 (quoting from Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285,
290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897)); see generally Note, Mental Distress - the Impact Rule,
42 UMKC L. REv. 235, 237-40 (1973) (discussing history of impact rule in Missouri).
17. See generally Note, supra note 16 (discussing history of impact rule).
18. E.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (recovery
for fright and consequential miscarriage denied because no immediate personal in-
jury); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (recovery for
mental distress and other injuries resulting from the distress denied because no injury
to person from without); see generally Note, Redefining the Limits to Recovery for
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, 11 TULSA L.J. 587, 589-92 (1976).
19. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 943.
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 363. The thin skull rule is applicable to
parasitic psychological injuries. That is, a plaintiff who is particularly susceptible to
psychological disorders may recover for idiosyncratic emotional harm provided such
harm results from the physical injuries. Id.; see Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446,
631 P.2d 1314 (1981).
3
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were genuine was viewed to be guaranteed by the establishment of direct
physical harm.2'
The impact rule was rationalized on various policy grounds including:
(1) fear of fraudulent claims; 2 (2) fear of excessive litigation; 23 (3) difficulty
of proof;24 (4) lack of precedent; 25 and (5) potential for unlimited liability.26
Many of these policy considerations have lost their force either because ex-
perience has proved that the policy has no basis in fact 27 or because other
more important social policies have overshadowed the original reasons behind
the impact rule.?
If viewed as a rule protecting emotional tranquility, the main criticism
of the impact rule is that it sets arbitrary boundaries within which a plaintiff's
claim must fall to allow an emotional distress recovery. 29 Under the impact
rule, a successful plaintiff must show: (1) a foreseeable risk of physical injury
disregarded by the defendant; (2) impact on the plaintiff; (3) physical injury
caused by such impact; and (4) emotional distress.3 0 These boundaries may
be considered arbitrary because they do not truly embody a policy protecting
emotional tranquility.' A defendant has no duty to protect a foreseeable
plaintiff from unreasonable risks of causing mental distress.3 2 This is because
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 363; Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769.
22. Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315, 357 N.E.2d 247
(1978); Morse v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903); Nelson v.
Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
23. Ward v. West Jersey & S.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Spade v.
Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899).
24. Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902);
Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.E.2d 335 (1899); Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo.
App. 4 (1901); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
25. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Haas v. Metz, 78 Ill. App. 46
(1898).
26. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Miller v.
Baltimore & O.S.W.R., 78 Ohio 309, 85 N.E. 489 (1908); Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo.
App. 4 (1901).
27. See generally Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769 (claiming difficulty of proof, fear
of fraudulent claims, and fear of excessive litigation are no longer relevant policy
considerations).
28. See generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH.
L. REV. 497 (1922) (arguing that emotional tranquility is an important interest that
should override the impact rule).
29. Pearson, supra note 12, at 488; Note, supra note 5, at 308.
30. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959).
31. Pearson, supra note 12, at 488.
32. Id. at 489. Under the impact rule, the defendant's only duty is to avoid
causing unreasonable risks which may inflict physical injury to foreseeable plaintiffs.
582 [Vol. 51
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the boundaries of a defendant's duty are not expanded by the impact rule
since recovery for emotional harm represents "parasitic" damages.33 If there
is no impact or direct physical injury, any emotional distress claim would
not reach the jury.34 Moreover, if a jury were to consider such a claim, its
analysis would only probe the defendant's creation of an unreasonable risk
of causing physical injury - not mental distress. 5 Thus, recovery for mental
distress was dependent on the judge or jury deciding threshold questions
which, at most, were only indirectly related to whether the plaintiff was
actually emotionally harmed.
Some jurisdictions, having recognized the inequity of the traditional
impact rule, have adopted a "liberalized" impact rule.3 6 In these jurisdictions,
recovery is allowed for emotional harm even if the impact is trivial and
produces no direct physical harm.3 7 This liberalized impact rule merely re-
defines two of the traditional rule's arbitrary barriers. First, any impact, no
matter how slight, satisfies the impact requirement.3" Second, although "di-
rect" physical harm is no longer required, the liberalized impact rule requires
that physical harm result from the mental distress.3 9
Although the liberalized impact rule allows more plaintiffs to reach the
jury, 40 the rule is nonetheless arbitrary if, again, it is measured against a
policy seeking to protect emotional serenity.4' Once a plaintiff falls within
33. See Note, supra note 7, at 219 (dealing with parasitic harm in general but
applicable to the impact rule).
34. See Fischer, supra note 7; Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH L. REV.
1 (1953). A proximate cause analysis, as opposed to a duty analysis, could also be used.
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 110 (1959).
35. Supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
36. See Note, The Expanding Definition of Liability - Dziokonski v. Babineau,
1 W. NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 795, 797 (1979); cf. Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry.,
180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's
Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929).
37. See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737
(1902) (a slight blow); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian,
232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (trifling burn); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa.
Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (trivial jolt or jar); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St.
115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage,
38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (reduced rule to absurdity where impact found
when horse "evacuated his bowels" in plaintiff's lap).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 363 and supra cases cited in note 37.
39. Fischer, supra note 7, at 944.
40. Potentially more plaintiffs would have jury questions under the liberalized
impact rule since any type of impact satisfies the requirement.
41. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the liberalized impact rule stat-ing:
It appears completely inconsistent to argue that the medical profession is
absolutely unable to establish a causal connection in the case where there is
no impact at all, but that the slightest impact ... suddenly bestows upon
our medical colleagues the knowledge and facility to diagnose the causal
1986] 583
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the "magic" boundary of impact, "the door opens to the full joy of complete
recovery. ' ' 42 As far as substantial justice is concerned, it seems that a plaintiff
is equally likely to suffer genuine mental distress when he escapes impact by
an inch as compared to when the impact is only slight.
43
B. The Zone of Danger Rule
Most jurisdictions have rejected the impact rule. 4 The move away from
the rule has led some jurisdictions to allow recovery to plaintiffs who fall
within a "zone of danger." Under this rule, a plaintiff may recover for
emotional harm when he was subject to the risk of impact and fear of this
impact caused mental distress which produced ensuing physical harm. 4 The
zone of danger rule eliminates the threshold requirement of impact and sub-
stantively expands liability by recognizing that emotional distress can be
caused through mediums other than actual physical contact.
46
The transition from the impact rule to the zone of danger rule suggests
an increased judicial willingness to protect emotional tranquility.4 7 However,
like the impact rule, the main criticism of the zone of danger rule is that it
does not fully coincide with the policy that defendants should be liable for
the foreseeable harm which they caused. 48 As stated above, a defendant has
no legal duty to guard against unreasonably inflicted mental distress. 49 Al-
though the impact requirement has been eliminated, a plaintiff still must
show that a defendant disregarded a foreseeable risk of physical harm. 0 This
risk of physical harm is manifested by the plaintiff being within the zone of
connection between emotional states and physical injury.
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 403, 261 A.2d 84, 87 (1970).
42. Goodrich, supra note 28, at 504.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 364. Dean Prosser has suggested that the
true value in the impact requirement is that it provides the defendant with the op-
portunity to testify that there was in fact no impact. Realistically, a defendant cannot
be sure whether he frightened another; however, he may be able to swear that during
the statute of limitation period he has struck no one. If a jury believes testimony
such as this, a plaintiff will be unable to recover in an impact rule jurisdiction. Id.
44. E.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978);
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Niederman
v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
45. See Note, supra note 33, at 220; see also Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (pedestrian allowed to recover despite absence of impact
provided he could prove fear of impact); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
46. Comment, supra note 5, at 313.
47. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
48. Pearson, supra note 12, at 485; see Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 564, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978).
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danger. Thus, if a plaintiff is deemed to be outside the zone of danger5' or
if no zone of danger exists,52 recovery for mental distress is not allowed.
A "zone of danger" is merely a court-created fiction. It is analagous
to the impact rule in that it seeks to establish a relationship between the
defendant's conduct creating a risk of physical injury and the emotional
consequences which flow from that risk.53 This relationship may be flawed
since all persons subject to the defendant's "physical risk conduct1' 5 4 will
not inevitably suffer distress. Further, this relationship does not extend to
persons actually suffering distress from conduct not involving a risk of im-
pact, such as abusive language. It must be remembered, however, that the
zone of danger rule, like the impact rule, represents a compromise between
conflicting policies. 55 Neither rule purports to cover all foreseeable emotional
injuries. If the law should protect emotional tranquility to the exclusion of
other policies, then the failure of these rules to do so is arbitrary.56
C. The Restatement Rules
The Restatement (Second) of Torts [hereinafter "Restatement"] recog-
nizes liability where a defendant unreasonably subjects another to an emo-
tional disturbance so great as to threaten bodily harm.57 That is, a defendant
may be liable if he creates a risk likely to cause such severe emotional distress
that as a secondary consequence illness or other bodily harm results. 8 This
secondary consequence is considered a physical injury. It is this physical
51. Questions can arise as to whether a plaintiff should be considered within
the zone of danger. That is, how near must a plaintiff be to the risk of direct physical
injury? Normally this would be a question of fact for the jury unless reasonable
minds cannot differ.
52. If no zone of danger exists or the plaintiff is considered outside the zone
of danger, he cannot recover for mental distress. He would be considered an un-
foreseeable plaintiff and the case dismissed under a "no duty" analysis. See Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.99 (1928).
53. Pearson, supra note 12, at 486.
54. Physical risk conduct is conduct which subjects another to direct physical
injury. Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation. Hospitals: California Expands Liability
for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291, 293 (1981)
55. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
56. Pearson, supra note 12, at 480.
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 306, 312, 313(1), 436(1); see McDonough
v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 516, 313 N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1974); Corso v. Merrill,
119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979); Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235,
240 (S.D. 1979). For a good discussion on the Restatement's view of liability for
emotional distress, see Fischer, supra note 7, at 948-50.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 306 commend d.
7
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injury which a defendant has a duty of care to avoid. 9 Further, a defendant
can only be found liable if his conduct actually causes the physical harm
created by his risk. 60
The Restatement rules do not protect mere "peace of mind," '6' but they
do represent a noteworthy change from the prior rules discussed above. Under
the Restatement, the defendant's conduct does not have to create any risk
involving direct physical injury.62 Thus recovery for abusive language which
foreseeably causes emotional distress and resulting physical injury is possible.
Further, emotional disturbance is only important to the extent that its ex-
istence involves the risk of resulting physical harm.63 If, however, recovery
is allowed for resulting physical harm, the primary emotional disturbance
can also be recovered. 64 For example, 65 suppose a hospital delivers the wrong
baby to a mother after delivery. The mother took the infant home and cared
for it until the hospital realized its mistake and informed the mother that
the offspring was not hers. Upon hearing this news, the mother suffered
emotional distress resulting in repeated hysterical attacks and mental aber-
ration. Under the Restatement rules, the mother may be able to recover for
the repeated hysterical attacks and mental aberration (a physical injury) and
also any original emotional distress (an element of damages). If, however,
physical injury did not result, but rather the mother merely had emotional
injuries resulting in one or two sleepless nights, the Restatement would not
allow recovery. 66
The Restatement rules have been criticized because of the difficulty in
defining "physical injury."' 67 Where emotional distress ends and resulting
59. Id. §§ 306, 313(1), 436(1). A defendant must be able to reasonably fore-
see the resulting physical harm. It is not necessary that a defendant foresee the
initial mental distress. Thus, a defendant can negligently inflict mental distress on
another and not assume the risk of any exceptional physical susceptibilities to emo-
tions which the other may have unless these susceptibilities are themself foreseeable.
Id. § 306 comment b.
60. Id. § 313(1).
61. Id. § 306 comment b.
62. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CA~in. L. REv. 40, 53 (1956).
63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 306 comment b.
64. Id.
65. This example is based on Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d
232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952). In this case the Restatement rationale was followed but
recovery was denied, the court stating, "definite nervous distrubance or disorders caused
by mental shock and excitement are classified as physical injuries and will support
an action for damages for negligence where they are the proximate result of negligence
on the part of the defendants." Id. at 234, 249 P.2d at 844. The only evidence of
injury was testimony that Mrs. Espinosa suffered severe back and stomach pain and
ached all over. Id., 249 P.2d at 844-45. The jury, evidently, did not credit these com-
plaints to nervous shock. Id., 249 P.2d at 845.
66. One or two sleepless nights would not be considered a physical injury. See
id. at 235-36, 249 P.2d at 845; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 436A comment c.
67. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 926-27, 616 P.2d
586 [Vol. 51
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physical injury begins may indeed be a difficult line to draw.68 In Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation,69 the California Supreme Court stated that a physical
injury requirement "encourages extravagant pleadings and distorted testi-
mony" and "with a little ingenuity" physical consequences can be made to
exist in most all cases involving mental distress.70 If the harm that concerns
the law is emotional, it can also be considered arbitrary to require the plaintiff
to suffer anything other than emotional harm. 7'
III. THE BASS BOUNDARY
The evolution of the law did not stop with the rules set forth in the
Restatement.72 Since the physical injury requirement could be viewed as ar-
813, 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772
(Mo. 1983) (en banc) (attempts to distinguish physical from mental injuries merely
creates a definitional problem and distracts from the essential question of proof of
injuries).
68. Comment c of the RESTATEMENT § 436A does not appear to make the line
any eaiser to draw:
The rule stated in this Section applies to all forms of emotional disturbance,
including temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage, and humil-
iation. The fact that these are accompanied by transitory, non-recurring
physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as dizziness, vomiting,
and the like, does not make the actor liable where such phenomena are in
themselves inconsequential and do not amount to any substantial bodily
harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may amount
to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental
disturbance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or
mental aberration, may be classified by the courts as illness, notwithstanding
their mental character. This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem, rather
than one of law.
RESTATEMENT § 436A comment c. See Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
657, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1973) (physical injury requirement was satisfied by proof
that plaintiff had "withdrawn from normal forms of socialization, was for a period
of nine months following the accident unable to function as she did previously, and
continues in a state of depression"); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979)
(majority characterized "severe depression" and "acute nervous condition" as phys-
ical and mental injuries while dissent stated complaint only involves emotional in-
juries).
69. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
70. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838; see also Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 115 n.16 (1959) which stated in footnote 16: "To refer to 'mental
distress alone' . . . is undoubtedly somewhat inaccurate, since ... mental disturbances
... is [sic] always characterized by a complex of physical reactions, and frequently it is
only an accident of pleading that the adverse consequenses complained of are char-
aterized as 'mental' rather than physical."
71. Pearson, supra note 12, at 510. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to
follow the Restatement rules when it recognized negligent infliction of mental distress
as an independent tort. The court stated "the requirement of physical injury ...
merely meant the replacement of one arbitrary artifical rule with another ... some-
what less restrictive." Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 771.
72. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d at 771.
9
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bitrary and artificial,73 a number of jurisdictions rejected the idea that phys-
ical injury must flow from the mental distress. 74 While courts recognized the
necessity of avoiding the imposition of liability for inconsequential emotional
injuries, some courts nonetheless felt that a screening device based on a
consequential physical injury requirement was too harsh in that it barred
many honest claims from ever reaching the jury.7" Thus courts began to
announce a more liberalized rule emphasizing the requirements that a plain-
tiff's injury must be foreseeable and serious. 76
The Missouri Supreme Court accepted this liberalized rule in Bass v.
Nooney Co.77 In Bass, the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress
allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence which resulted in the plaintiff
being trapped in an elevator for about thirty minutes. 78 The court set forth
a two-pronged rule in determining liability for negligently inflicted mental
distress. Under this rule, a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress if
"(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unrea-
sonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress or mental
injury [is] medically diagnosable and ...medically significant."79 Impact,
direct physical injury, or ensuing physical injury are not prerequisites to
recover damages for emotional distress. Rather, it is the boundaries of fore-
seeability and severity which determine whether a plaintiff can recover for
emotional injuries.
A. Bass in Troubled Waters
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District tried to articulate
the Bass boundaries in Young v. Stensrude.0 In Young, the plaintiff, Olivia
Young, attended a business meeting at her employer's office.," Her employer,
73. Id.
74. Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980);
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646
S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131,
447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
75. Supra note 74.
76. Supra note 74.
77. 646 S.W.2d at 772.
78. Id. at 766. The plaintiff alleged that while trapped in the elevator she got
"warm" and began "feeling strange." Id. After the incident the plaintiff was placed
in a hospital under heavy sedation. Id. at 767. At trial a psychiatrist testified the
plaintiff suffered a severe anxiety reaction. Id. The psychiatrist also expressed the
opinion that the plaintiff would not suffer any permanent disability from the incident.
Id.
79. Id. at 772-73.
80. 664 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
81. Id. at 265.
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Richard Stensrude, the defendant in this action, along with four other men,
also attended this meeting. During the gathering the defendant suggested that
they all view an "educational" film entitled Deep Throat.2 This film ran
for a brief period before the plaintiff realized the film was pornographic
rather than educational. During the film's projection, the defendant was
"uttering sexual obscenities" at the plaintiff.83 The plaintiff fled from the
meeting.
The plaintiff alleged that as a result of the defendant's conduct she
suffered "emotional shock and mental distress, incurred expenses for medical
care, and sustained other damage." 84 She asserted that the defendant's actions
gave rise to a claim for either intentional or negligent infliction of mental
distress.
The trial court dismissed both counts for failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.85 The court of appeals reversed and remanded
the trial court's decision. 86 The court properly recognized negligent infliction
of mental distress to be an independent tort under Missouri law. The court
viewed the dispositive question to be whether the "acts of showing a por-
nographic movie to an unsuspecting female in a room with five men while
making obscene remarks could ever ... create an unreasonable risk of in-
flicting the requisite harm."8 " Based on this question the court held that the
defendant's conduct could constitute an actionable wrong.8
The court's question merely restated the Bass boundary. 9 Although the
decision may have been proper, little judicial analysis was offered to support
the holding. This is because the Bass standard creates a new problem. The
boundaries of liability under the Bass rule are vague. Bass itself offers little
guidance for determining whether a potential defendant should be held liable.
Although some vagueness in a rule is perhaps inevitable, a rule should not
be so vague as to provide insufficient guidance to judges and juries who are
82. Plaintiff apparently believed the film was educational and thought the title
was a "literary pun." Brief for Appellant at ii, Young v. Stenstrude, 664 S.W.2d
263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
83. 664 S.W.2d at 265.
84. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that because of defendant's conduct she was
unable to accompany her husband to their wedding anniversary plans scheduled the
night of the incident, was unable to resume sexual contact with her husband for
several months, had to seek professional counseling, and was unable to perform her
employment duties or function in a business environment. Brief, supra note 82, at
iii.
85. 664 S.W.2d at 264.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 265.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
11
Petrofsky: Petrofsky: Young v. Stensrude
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
required to apply the rule.9 In this sense, the Bass boundaries are arbitrary,
not because they represent a compromise between conflicting social policies,
but rather because the rule offers no uniform standard for determining liability.
B. Foreseeability and Unreasonable Risk Boundary
Liability for negligently inflicted mental distress must rest on a finding
of: (1) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2)
violation of this duty; and (3) damages, i.e., mental distress, which were
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. 9'
Although the above formula appears mechanical, an analysis of a tort
by each of these elements can create confusion. This is because courts use
foreseeability both to determine if a defendant is under an initial duty and
also as a measuring rod in determining how far a defendant's liability should
extend. 92 Foreseeability is therefore important in determining the boundaries
of liability under the Bass standard. Bass' first prong involves the creation
of an "unreasonable risk" that the defendant "should have realized" could
cause "the distress." 9 a This prong necessarily involves foreseeability because
negligence cannot be found unless a defendant is capable of reasonably fore-
seeing at least some injury resulting from his conduct. 94 Bass leaves vague
exactly how foreseeability can serve to limit liability in emotional distress
cases. This is important for two reasons. First, foreseeability as a limitation
on liability, may determine whether a judge decides the case in the first
instance or throws the foreseeability issue to a jury. Second, if a jury does
decide the case, liability can only be limited if the jury is capable of deter-
mining the foreseeable issue with respect to the specific factual setting.
1. Foreseeability: The Duty Boundary
Bass created a duty in defendants to foresee "an unreasonable risk of
causing ... distress." 95 This expanded liability under prior law where a
defendant had no duty to foresee unreasonable risks of inflicting mental
90. Pearson, supra note 12, at 483. When rules are vague, decisions are made
based on what seems important to the decision maker. Decisions are therefore ar-
bitrary because they do not depend on any generally agreed upon principles. Id.
91. Note, supra note 5, at 317; see also Boyle v. City of Phoenix, 115 Ariz.
106, 563 P.2d 905 (1977). See generally Prosser, supra note 34.
92. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 297-98, 358.
93. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
94. Jurisdictions differ as to exactly what they require a defendant to foresee.
See generally Prosser, supra note 34 (good discussion of how different jurisdictions
view foreseeability, duty, and proximate cause).
95. 646 S.W.2d at 772.
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distress.96 As a limitation on liability, the duty question can become impor-
tant. Duty is a legal issue decided by the judge.9 7 Therefore, a judge can
maintain control over a lawsuit and limit liability by withholding the case
from the jury.98
The problem with using duty to limit liability is that it is neither capable
of precise definition nor firm application. Dean Prosser stated that duty, in
a negligence case, is "an obligation to which the law will give recognition
and effect, to conform to [a particular] standard of conduct. . . ."99 Beyond
this, Dean Prosser stated that duty arises from some "relation" between the
parties, but exactly what this relation consists of is yet undefined.'0 Thus,
without the firm criteria essential to answer the duty question, the term is
reduced to a "legal symbol" and is often a substitute for analysis.' 0'
Some courts use foreseeability to create a "relation" between a plaintiff
and a defendant and therefore entitle a plaintiff to protection. 0 2 That is,
foreseeability may be used as an outer boundary beyond which duty cannot
extend. 03 Thus, if no risk is foreseeable, a judge may dismiss a case in the
first instance since a defendant is under no duty to conform to a particular
standard of conduct.
Using foreseeability of the risk to aid in determining whether the defend-
ant had an initial duty is not very helpful in analysis. All conduct is risk
creating.'14 Some type of distress can occur in almost any situation. For
example, suppose X, on one occasion, solicits Y for the purpose of illicit
intercourse. Recovery has normally been denied, in these types of cases, on
the general theory "that there is no harm in asking."'0 5 However, is it nec-
96. Fischer, supra note 7, at 942.
97. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 13 (1977).
98. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 942.
99. Prosser, supra note 34, at 12.
100. Id. at 13.
101. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 357-58.
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question -
whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct .... [Tihe problem of duty is as broad as the law of
negligence ... no universal test of [duty] has been formulated. It is a short-
hand statement for a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself....
'[D]uty' is ... only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the lav to say that [a particular] plaintiff is entitled to
protection. Id.
102. Note, supra note 5, at 317.
103. Prosser, supra note 34, at 16.
104. Thode, supra note 97, at 8. Risk creating conduct is not only important
to the duty question but also when the jury decides the foreseeability issue.
105. E.g., Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge,
32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900); Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAgv. L. REv. 1033, 1055 (1936).
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essarily true that there is no harm (or risk) in asking? Is there not a con-
ceivable risk, foreseeable to X, that Y will suffer some sort of emotional
distress? Carrying this example further, suppose X makes the proposal twice
or three times or in conjuction with the proposals sends Y obscene photo-
graphs of himself?' °6 At some point there is a harm in asking, but when is
this risk sufficiently foreseeable for a judge to impose an initial duty on a
defendant?
The Bass standard makes it conceptually more difficult to dismiss a case
under a "no duty" rationale since this standard recognizes that a person's
mental well-being is entitled to protection. Almost every case involving the
possibility of personal injury also involves the possibility of mental suffer-
ing. 07 Further, almost every practical joke or abusive language case also
contains the risk of emotional upset. 0 8 Perhaps it is impossible to reduce the
duty question to a definite rule; however, foreseeability should not serve as
the only boundary.109 Foreseeability, without proper limitation, is too un-
certain a foundation."10 Since without a legal duty, the case cannot go to the
jury and liability cannot be imposed, a judge is confronted with an initial
issue which only he can answer."' Nonetheless, in the overwhelming number
of tort cases, the courts assume that there is a duty without discussion."12 It
is useful, therefore, to articulate some rational bases upon which considered
judgement can be made.
First, the duty question should only be addressed in conjunction with
the interest this new tort seeks to protect." '3 The interest is emotional; after
all, the tort's name is negligent infliction of emotional distress.'" Looking at
any interest other than protection of emotional tranquility as a criteria to
establish a duty is arbitrary in the same way the impact rule or the zone of
danger rule arbitrarily protected a person's emotional interests through a
106. See Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1960). It should be noted that as the offense becomes more morally outrageous
a court is more apt to view the case as one of intentional infliction of mental distress.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 312; Prosser, supra note 62 (discussing intentional
infliction of mental distress).
107. Williams, The Risk Principle, 77 L.Q. REv. 179, 193 (1961).
108. See Prosser, supra note 62.
109. Note, supra note 5, at 322.
110. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,
1025 (1928).
11I. Id. at 1029-30. In a close case a judge cannot bypass his function and let
the jury decide whether the defendant's conduct created a foreseeable risk. The very
passing of the case automatically means he has determined a duty exists, otherwise
the case would be dismissed.
112. Thode, supra note 97.
113. Green, supra note 110. As has been noted, almost any tort conceivable
can result in emotional upset. My point, however, in emphasizing a protectible emo-
tional interest is simply that it serves to narrow the analysis.
114. Pearson, supra note 12, at 510.
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defendant's duty to foresee unreasonable risks of direct injury. For example,
suppose X bought his dream car from Y dealership. Y dealership negligently
inspected this car and it broke down when X drove it home immediately
after the sale. X became emotionally upset and sued the dealership for neg-
ligent infliction of mental distress. In this example, a court should center its
analysis on X's emotional interest, i.e., was there a foreseeable risk that a
purchaser of a new automobile which immediately malfunctions would suffer
the requisite distress? It would be arbitrary to allow this emotional distress
claim based on the proposition that a malfunctioning car is more likely to
result in an automobile accident and the defendant should have foreseen this
risk of physical injury. If analyzed in this latter way the interest primarily
protected is freedom from direct physical injury. The possibilities of liability
would thus greatly be expanded beyond mere recognition of negligently in-
flicted mental distress. The Bass court used language which seems to accept
this arbitrary analysis. The court stated that a jury question would be gen-
erated if a defendant disregards a "foreseeable likelihood that either physical
or psychic harm might be caused. .". ."I" Thus, arguably under Bass a
defendant may have an initial duty to guard against inflicting mental distress
caused by the creation of an unreasonable risk of physical harm, even if
physical harm does not in fact occur.
Second, a judge should examine how much protection should be given
this emotional interest. ' 6 For example, suppose X tells Y, "Your shirt doesn't
match your pants." Further, suppose Y actually suffers severe distress from
this comment. Under Bass, can X be found liable for negligently inflicting
mental distress? It has already been noted that all conduct is risk creating.
Therefore, some distress is foreseeable in almost any situation. Negligence,
however, only compensates for unreasonable risks, that is risks which, be-
cause of there nature, give rise to a duty in the defendant to conform to a
reasonable standard of care." 7
In Bass, a duty only arises from conduct creating "an unreasonable risk
of causing the distress.""8 Thus, the answer to the above hypothetical may
depend on the Bass standard of distress." 9 In other words, how much distress
can a potential defendant make another endure before the risk becomes
115. 646 S.W.2d at 774. It could be argued that the Bass court used the term
physical injury to refer to bodily harm which results from mental distress. Supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text. However, when discussing what risk the defend-
ant should foresee, the court viewed as important the physical hazard the plaintiff
was exposed to. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 773-74 n.6. For instance, the court discussed
the physical hazards the plaintiff would be exposed to if an emergency rescue from
the elevator had taken place. Id.
116. Green, supra note 110, at 1025.
117. Prosser, supra note 34, at 6.
118. 646 S.W.2d at 772; supra text accompanying note 79.
119. 646 S.W.2d at 772; supra text accompanying note 79.
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foreseeable that "the distress" which Bass contemplates will be caused?
Initially, it should be noted that when the Bass court set forth the two-
pronged test, the word "severe" was applied to the degree of required mental
distress, not to the degree of risk created by the defendant. 20 However, in
applying the foreseeability prong the court stated that the defendant must
foresee "serious emotional distress.' ' 2' Clearly, policy considerations dictate
that a seriousness requirement should be read into the foreseeability prong.
Bass did not contemplate protecting trivial emotional claims or peace of
mind. People must be expected "to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind."'2 Further, trivial claims lack the guarantee that the emotional dis-
tress is serious or that, if serious, the emotional distress suffered is reason-
able. 23 Thus, going back to the hypothetical, it seems X should be free to
express an unflattering opinion, even if severe distress results, since the risk
of such distress was not unreasonable.
Other factors, besides foreseeability of a sufficiently severe risk, should
also be considered by a judge in determining if a duty exists. A protectable
interest should more readily be found if there is sufficient moral blame
attached to a defendant's conduct. 24 For example, practical jokes, where a
defendant wants to get a laugh out of a plaintiff's embarrassment, may fall
into this category. In fact, Young could be viewed as being an unreasonable
practical joke. The defendant's conduct had little social value. When this
conduct is measured against a foreseeable risk of serious mental distress, 25
it is not very difficult to establish duty.
120. 646 S.W.2d at 772; supra text accompanying note 79.
121. 646 S.W.2d at 773. If seriousness should be read into the foreseeability
test, it becomes somewhat analagous to the Restatement rules where a defendant must
foresee the resulting physical harm. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 306. This
is because of the definitional problems inherent in distinguishing serious mental dis-
tress from mental distress which results in physical injuries.
122. Prosser, supra note 62, at 44. In response to the proposition that the law
should protect peace of mind, Professor Magruder stated:
Adoption of the suggested principle would open up a wide vista of litigation
in the field of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better
be dealt with by instruments of social control other than the law. Quite
apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good thing in itself, it
would be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general securing of it.
Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temper-
aments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening
of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.
Magruder, supra note 105, at 1035.
123. Prosser, supra note 62, at 44.
124. See Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971) (doctor rude to
injured mother and child). See generally Note, supra note 7, at 230-32.
125. Supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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Further, an unreasonable risk of causing "the distress" may exist if the
defendant's action is directed at a plaintiff and the defendant knows or
should know that any error is likely to cause mental distress. 126 This situation
often arises in cases involving particularly sensitive information,2 7 which, if
wrongly transmitted, is practically certain to cause emotional upset. In these
cases, the risk of harm clearly creates a duty upon the defendant to correctly
transmit the information.' 28
Also, an unreasonable risk of causing "the distress" may be created
where the risk is one involving an object deemed worthy of emotional at-
tachment.' 29 For example, if a defendant tells X that her husband died after
the defendant was told by X's friends that they wanted to break the news
to her gently, the defendant may be liable for ensuing distress.
The difficulty in determining if a duty exists stems from the flexibility
of this new tort. Duty can only be judged on a case by case basis.'30 In a
sense, any standard has to be arbitrary because a rule must be flexible enough
to be able to be applied to varying factual situations. One must keep mind,
however, that "we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical
and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind."' 3'
2. Foreseeability: The Proximate Cause Boundary
Duty and proximate cause both address the same question: whether legal
protection will be available to a plaintiff. 3 2 Usually, where cases are decided
under a proximate cause rationale, they might just as easily have been decided
by using a duty analysis.' 33 This is because both analytical methods focus on
foreseeability. '3 Ordinarily, however, duty has been confined to establish
"the existence of some relation between the defendant and the plaintiff which
gives rise to the obligation of conduct in the first instance.'1 3 Proximate
126. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (spouse wrongly diagnosed with syphilis); Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (notice that mother died).
127. Note, supra note 7, at 230-31.
128. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
129. See Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosps., 153 N.J.
Super. 79, 379 A.2d 57 (1977) (hospital could not locate baby's body or confirm
death for three weeks). For a case which stretches emotional attachment to the limit,
see Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (emotional attachment
based on damages to home).
130. Comment, supra note 9, at 588.
131. Prosser, supra note 34, at 15.
132. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 298.
133. See Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence - A Retreat from Rational-
ization, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 36 (1938).
134. Id.
135. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 275.
1986]
17
Petrofsky: Petrofsky: Young v. Stensrude
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
cause, on the other hand, has dealt with the consequences which have fol-
lowed once this obligation has arisen. 3 6
Thus, proximate cause is more concerned with finding an ending bound-
ary to liability.'37 This is particularly important in emotional distress cases
because different people have differing susceptibilities to emotional harm.
For example, suppose X, a male, dresses up like a female and enters a girl's
locker room. Y, a female, discovers X and becomes so embarrassed she
suffers emotional distress resulting in a miscarriage. Assuming a court is
willing to find a duty to use reasonable care, should X be liable for all the
damage? Clearly, X's conduct created some risk, but it is unlikely a reason-
able person would have foreseen a miscarriage.
The issue addressed in the above example is the limitation on liability
for unforeseeable damage. Initially, it must be remembered that in order to
impose liability, the defendant must be able to foresee some risk. 8 In fact,
we already noted that Bass' first prong implicitly requires the defendant to
be able to foresee "serious" mental distress.'3 9 Thus our inquiry can be
narrowly stated to be: given the foreseeability of serious distress, does this
necessarily mean that a defendant is liable for all subsequent emotional harm?
According to the "thin skull rule," a defendant takes a plaintiff as he
finds him and once foreseeability of the general risk is established a defendant
would be liable for all injuries to an emotionally sensitive plaintiff provided
the defendant's conduct aggravated this susceptibility. '4 The thin skull rule
can be supported by the policy that as between a negligent defendant and an
innocent but emotionally sensitive plaintiff, the loss should fall upon the
wrongdoing defendant.' 4' However, given that emotional susceptibility varies
among people, there would seem to be an equally strong policy argument
for a defendant. That is, there is an inherent inequity in imposing what could
be "ruinous liability which no private fortune could meet," for unintentional
conduct, and "which is out of all proportion to the defendant's fault.' 42
Proximate cause may be used to limit liability in these "thin skull" cases
where the injuries caused exceed the foreseeable risk. 43 This is because prox-
imate cause is a question of law and can give a judge control to rule on the
136. Id.
137. Prosser, supra note 34, at 24.
138. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
139. Supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
140. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 292.
141. Id. at 293.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 43, at 280-81. Note the Dean Prosser states a duty analysis could
also be used: "[Ils the defendant under a legally responsible to protect the plaintiff
against such unforeseeable consequenses of the defendant's own negligent act?" Id.
at 281. Traditionally, however, courts have used a proximate cause analysis to answer
that question. Supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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case.'" Proximate cause, however, is based on broad policy considerations.' 4
It focuses on foreseeability and also on "our [fundamental] feelings about
fair and just limits to legal responsibility."'' 46 Thus, like duty, proximate
cause is vague and conclusory.' 47 It "carries only an illusion of certainty in
defining the consequences for which the defendant will be liable .... what
happened should not be 'too cockeyed and far-fetched.1"
C. Medically Diagnosable and Sufficient Severity
Besides a defendant disregarding an unreasonable risk of causing dis-
tress, Bass requires actual distress to occur and be of such a nature as to be
classified as both medically diagnosable and severe. 49 Thus, under Bass a
defendant could be extremely unreasonable and not be liable if the emotional
injuries caused do not meet the Bass severity standard. 50
The problem with mental distress in relation to damages is one of def-
inition and application. Mental distress presents a legal issue surrounded by
medical considerations. '5' The Bass court seemed to accept the definition of
mental distress as "any traumatically induced reaction which is medically
detrimental to the individual.' '1 52 Courts will have to translate this medical
definition into a legal standard to be applied in specific cases.' 53
Conceptually, it is difficult to imagine how a legal standard could be
applied on a case by case basis to differentiate severe from nonsevere mental
144. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471
(1950).
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 281. The policy considerations discussed
under the duty section would be equally applicable.
146. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 20.5, at 1135 (1956).
147. Prosser, supra note 34, at 24.
148. Id. at 19.
149. Supra note 77 and accompanying text. There are at least three concerns
which justify that some limitation be placed on the definition of mental distress: (1)
the problem of permitting legal redress for emotional injuries that are often trivial
and temporary; (2) the problem that the emotional injuries will be imagined or fal-
sified; (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy financial burdens on a negligent
defendant where the consequenses appear remote from the wrongful act. W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, at 360-61; see Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171
(1982); RESTATEMENT § 436A comment b.
150. For other cases requiring serious distress, see Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Leong v, Takasaki,
55 Hawaii 398,, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
151. See Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneuroses and Law,
6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 428, 428-29 (1957).
152. 646 S.W.2d at 773 n.4.
153. Id.; Comment, supra note 9, at 1254. Bass apparently leaves for the judge




Petrofsky: Petrofsky: Young v. Stensrude
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
distress.'54 Severity is a matter of degree and not an either/or proposition.,"
Thus, any standard will either be so high as to not include many justifiable
claims or so low as to extend liability further than policy suggests. A middle
ground could be viewed as arbitrary because it is doomed to inconsistent
application." 6 The dissenting opinion in Bass objected to this inherent va-
gueness in the severity requirement and asked, "What does 'medically sig-
nificant' mean in a courtroom."'1
7
In reality, the severity requirement is not much different than the Res-
tatement's resulting physical harm requirement.' 58 Both rules are vague, al-
lowing judges and juries to "play games" in determining who shall recover.
The problem, however, is how to limit liability. If a plaintiff pleads "serious
emotional injuries" and presents an expert at trial, Bass implied the threshold
burden of medically diagnosable distress is met. 5 9 Thus, most plaintiffs could
expect to reach the jury. This is not a true limit on liability, and when both
parties present experts, the jury will have little guidance to enable it to choose
rationally between conflicting expert testimony.' 60
IV. CONCLUSION
The law has developed a strong policy of freedom from emotional dis-
tress. Bass merely provides an approach to further this policy via a vague
general statement of the law. Vague as the standard is, it does provide that
the elements of negligence must be established before liability is imposed.
However, the basis of negligence beyond mere foreseeability is difficult to
describe, and the concept of foreseeability is susceptible to overbroad for-
154. Pearson, supra note 12, at 511.
155. Id.
156. Id. One commentator examined what harm is necessary to support a claim
for negligent infliction of mental distress and suggested that the emotional harm must
be serious enough to require medical attention. Comment, Negligence and the Infl-
iction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CI.
L. REV. 512, 517 (1968). The Bass court did not explicitly state that a plaintiff had
to seek medical attention to support a claim for negligent infliction of mental distress;
however, the court insinuated that such treatment may be necessary by citing with
approval the above-mentioned comment. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 773 n.4.
157. 646 S.W.2d at 781 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Judge Welliver was of the
opinion that "any damage verdict rendered under the evidence would be unjust
because of the metaphysical character of plaintiff's suffering and would constitute
an award of punitive damages ... ." Id. at 780-81 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
158. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
159. 646 S.W.2d at 773 n.4.
160. See Robin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Rein-
terpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981). Given the difficulties of proof in mental
distress cases, the nuisance value of a lawsuit should be taken into consideration.
That is, cases involving negligent infliction of mental distress could very well have a
settlement value so great even the trivial claim is worth something.
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mulations. Although flexibility is important in civil law, the Bass rule is too
flexible a concept in that no one knows how to apply the general rule. True,
negligent infliction of emotional distress is a noteworthy concept, but it is
doomed to inconsistent applications.
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